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Perspective Piece
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Abstract. The current strategy used by many funding agencies for determining how money is spent on research to
help prevent infectious disease outbreaks is based on pathogen-speciﬁc priority lists. Listing disease threats provides
focus for business and research planning conducive to speciﬁc goals of developing a drug, or a vaccine, or other particular
product. But, this singular type of focus has consequences. This perspective explores the consequences of lists, and
describes how parallel programming independent of disease lists that address what we need to do to prevent and mitigate
emerging disease risks may provide beneﬁts out of reach of a singular focus on what products we need to have.

a list of anything is a reductive process. It requires the smashing
together of many interests and suppositions about what is true
and necessary. Such lists sometimes are defended with the idea
that lists provide broad clarity. This carries two ﬂawed presumptions—ﬁrst, that transparency results and, second, that
diverse stakeholders can be treated equally. To the ﬁrst ﬂaw, very
few disease list makers disclose how their lists are generated,
let alone share those lists explicitly. The WHO and the Coalition
for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) do, in part because resource mobilization is part of their mandate. The National Institutes for Health (NIH) do so inadvertently in retrospect,
through mandatory public disclosure of what has been spent, but
this does not reveal their pre-expenditure strategy. Most other
funders, private foundations and governmental entities alike,
simply do not share anything about their lists and communicate
solely through calls for proposals that vary in how much they
disclose regarding spending strategy. To the second ﬂaw, disease lists have a glaring original sin. Lists implicitly communicate
what is most important to their creator, and to date, organizations
creating lists think individual viral diseases are most important.
We argue that although useful to the extent of aiding in the development of speciﬁc tools, this is thinking done in the wrong
direction.
The WHO R&D Blueprint is a strategy and preparedness
plan that develops research agendas on a predetermined
list of priority pathogens not otherwise covered by major
programs. These are infectious disease-causing agents
that a panel of experts believes are most likely to cause a
health emergency and for which there are insufﬁcient effective countermeasures. They select them through a process comparing individual disease threats against each
other for characteristics relevant to causing pandemics and
so harm, together with whether tools are available to ﬁght
them. What most of the world sees from this R&D Blueprint
process is arguably its smallest product, the list. The list
receives media attention and is used by external funding
entities. Most notably, CEPI has used the list as a starting
point for its endeavors. The CEPI is a multi-stakeholder
funding entity formed for the purpose of bringing vaccine
and related products against potential epidemic threats
that are close to licensure to completion.
Understanding a list’s purpose is key to knowing what to do
with a list. In general, we love lists. Managing public resources

How do funding choices help advance research against
threats before they become major epidemics? How has
our love for listing diseases prepared us against future
outbreaks? Maybe, we should do lists completely
differently. Global outbreak preparedness efforts increase
and mature in ﬁts and spurts. Global recognition of threats
such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) and avian inﬂuenza A (H5N1) in the early 2000s
pushed alert, outbreak, and response mechanisms, including
a revision of the International Health Regulations at the World
Health Organization (WHO). Eventually, in concert with
country-level initiatives, organizing forces started concentrating more on research related to outbreaks, too. In 2013,
world attention was focused on the pandemic potential of
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
and avian inﬂuenza A (H7N9), only to be surprised by the
2014–2016 Ebola virus disease epidemic in West Africa.
However, the large scale of the Ebola epidemic and particular
difﬁculties in trying to do research under stress in places where
constructive traditions of research were not already in place
highlighted the need for a more proactive approach. As a result, the WHO research and development (R&D) Blueprint was
born. (http://www.who.int/blueprint/en/)
Where are we today in being ready for pandemic threats?
Since 2014, we have had two major Ebola virus disease outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo—one still
ongoing—and a Marburg disease outbreak in Uganda. Yet,
there remains no licensed therapeutic medication for either
pathogen. There was also a large plague outbreak in Madagascar that persisted despite the existence of a simple,
known, therapeutic agent. What, then, are we doing wrong?
In this piece, we attack lists of diseases and use a WHO list
as an example for discussion. We make a case that although
convenient for business and research governance, and
probably necessary as part of a more comprehensive approach, such lists presently dominate thinking around R&D
funding and as such result in unsatisfactory consequences to
achieving patient- and community-centered outcomes. Making
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is a heady responsibility. Priorities must be set. Another notable list is the U.S. Federal Select Agent Program’s list. This
list governs regulatory practice when handling infectious
disease-causing agents or their products. Although built
around laboratory and specimen handling requirements, it is
used as a guidepost for the generation of a subset of lists that
drive advanced development of medical countermeasures
meant for stockpiles, such as that elected by the U.S. Government’s Biomedical Advanced Research and Development
Authority (BARDA).
These lists are different, built for different purposes, and yet
often are read and compared in the same way. Worse, the lists
look alike. They focus on the disease-causing pathogens,
speciﬁcally. Infectious disease research portfolios are organized similarly. A consequence of this is that we miss opportunities to seek broadly applicable solutions to challenges in
preventing and mitigating epidemics.
What if we did something completely different? What if
we instead focused on challenges posed by multiple pathogens
that need to be overcome to prevent and mitigate an epidemic?
Instead of saying, we do not have a vaccine against SARS-CoV,
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so we should list SARS-CoV, we say, we need a way to rapidly
make effective vaccines and get them ready for use in humans
quickly. Examples of efforts could include technologies that
rapidly ﬁnd vaccine targets; safe, insertable technologies for
delivering an immunogenic protein and those that quickly and
accurately assess toxicity and immune performance of candidate products before placing them in people; and, just as importantly, improving the regulatory pathways that these data
feed.
We explored NIH-reported research funding awards in the
context of known or estimated disease burden focusing on
diseases that are discussed in the R&D Blueprint and adding
comparators (Figure 1). We focused on NIH funding for its
breadth and transparency to illustrate the issues, although the
ﬁgure does not incorporate other funders in this space, such
as CEPI, the Gates Foundation, BARDA, the Wellcome Trust,
and other U.S., international, and foreign donors, and may
have missed some NIH platform investments because of the
limitations of the data’s taxonomy. Small changes in case burden
for less common diseases make marked differences in comparative costs in the ﬁgure. Also, investments that attempt to

FIGURE 1. Recent National Institutes for Health (NIH) emerging disease funding. (A) Recent NIH investment against case and death burdens by
disease pathogen. Employing multiple open-source estimates for average annual case and death burdens, and a normalized 5-year annual
investment when available, or 2013/2016 average when 5-year data are not available from https://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx,
published July 3, 2017 (new summary data through 2017 but not detailed information were published in May 2018, so have not been incorporated);
(B) Percent changes in individual emerging disease investments comparing 2013 and 2016; *indicates that the investment amount exceeds scale;
for Zika, normalized annual investment per death was approximately USD 4.4M; #percent change is greater than scale: for Filoviruses, 640%
increase and for Zika, the increase went from 0 to more than 61M USD. This ﬁgure appears in color at www.ajtmh.org.
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curtail future case burden are different from reactive funding
against existing high case burdens, such as with Zika virus.
However, it provides some context for scale and comparison of
investment, and illustrates recent shifts in funding. Of note, in
Figure 1B, Crimean–Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF), Nipah,
and Rift Valley fever all experienced large decreases in NIH
funding between 2013 and 2016, despite being ﬂagged by the
WHO priority lists in 2015 and 2016. National Institutes for Health
consistently spends the largest single allocations of money on
the major infectious disease killers, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis (TB); they are included in the ﬁgure as a frame of
reference for scale when looking at the more variable aspects of
that porfolio, scale in terms of both dollars and disease burden.
Research for platform technologies, those intentionally sought
for application against a myriad of emergencies, receive an average of 12 million dollars annually. This is a very small fraction of
awards: in 2016, this accounted for 1/5 of that spent on Zika, 1/10
that on Ebola, and 0.4% that on HIV. Although the NIH expends
on what researchers request of it, scientists must submit proposals, and do so in ways that result in funding which includes
preferentially choosing calls that are well funded. Do the common
elements of interceding or preventing epidemics from any pathogen or from classes of pathogen really amount to a percent or
less of what must be known?
A good example of consequences from planning based on
pathogens rather than emergencies is plague. The pathogens
that make the R&D Blueprint priority list cause substantial disease, may spread, disrupting public health infrastructures and
economies. By those metrics, though, why are cholera and plague not on the list? With the possible exception of smallpox, the
historical, acute devastation by plague in Europe and Asia has
little rival. These emergencies continue today with Madagascar,
India, and central Asian states having experienced recent outbreaks. A quick review of WHO Disease Outbreak News over the
last 5 years reveals that plague-related news postings easily are
in the top 10, if not in the top ﬁve of reported events.
Why does plague not make the priority lists? The common
response from colleagues is that antibacterial drugs exist and
can be easily distributed against plague, in particular ﬂuoroquinolones such as ciproﬂoxacin, so plague should not be a
priority. Ciproﬂoxacin has been around for years and yet we
continue to have signiﬁcant outbreaks of plague, recently a large
one. A list and priority process performed completely differently,
however, might ask what resources are needed to stop outbreaks rather than what pathogens need to be stopped. That list
might have focused on the need for easily disseminated antibacterial therapies, as soon as they are needed. It might have
sparked logistics or drug formulation research. Fights against
pneumonic plague, such as those against MERS-CoV, pandemic inﬂuenza, and many other pathogens, would be helped by
a listed need for better community-based infection, prevention,
and control research, leading to measures that are practical,
culturally acceptable, and ﬁt for rapid ﬁeld deployment. Many
proactive risk management approaches would beneﬁt from
better research on interdicting animal to human crossover
events.
A priority list based on necessary functions in the prevention
and interruption of emergencies is completely different, and must
yield different foci for research than pathogen-based processes
that seek to incorporate broader concepts as an afterthought.
There are some very speciﬁc research funding grant mechanisms
that increasingly attempt to target needs that are non-pathogen

based. The CEPI and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency both have launched calls for proposals that seek novel
technology platforms for developing vaccines and other medical
products faster, less than the 10- to 20-year horizon presently
faced by product developers. The DARPA and BARDA also have
funding calls for enhancing how people ﬁght infections generally
rather than how to ﬁght a speciﬁc infection. These funding practices should be more broadly adopted. However, they are initiatives arising without a supportive discourse about the many
actions that must be taken to prevent or mitigate a health emergency, rather than what must be on hand against a speciﬁc
pathogen.
A modiﬁed approach for setting priorities could result in more
funding stability, unlike what has been experienced recently. From
2013 to 2016, NIH awards for research on Ebola and related
viruses increased 6-fold and funding for Zika virus went from zero
to more than 60 million dollars. On the other hand, Nipah virus, Rift
Valley Fever virus, and CCHF virus research awards fell 50–100%
between 2013 and 2016, despite all three of them being listed in
the WHO R&D Blueprint. Applicants for awards must follow the
guidance for the grants. When these rapid changes occur, some
laboratories must walk away from research progress against
important threats to be eligible for continued funding, even when
that progress can only be made over time in sustained work.
Finally, this change in strategy—redeﬁning what makes a good
list, and how it is used if at all—could have beneﬁcial impacts on
mitigating large, transformative infectious disease emergencies
that traditional R&D programming ﬁnds difﬁcult. Decades of R&D
have curbed, but not quelled, HIV, malaria, TB, and cholera from
their dominance in impacting vulnerable areas, nor has the impact
of pediatric enteric and respiratory diseases diminished in import.
These threats are pervasive, despite massive investments over
decades toward their mitigation. Although details matter, one
reason for their continued circulation may be that we have not
looked more closely at those at risk; instead, we have focused too
singularly on traditional product development pathways. Compounding this is that R&D goals and regulatory guidance are
sometimes absent diverse and evolving perspectives.
Moving forward. No one can predict the future. We must
ensure that as we prepare for public health emergencies caused
by infectious disease threats, we focus on positively inﬂuencing
prevention and response rather than too much on the tools
themselves. We need a bit less attention on what makes speciﬁc
infectious disease pathogens different, and more on how they are
alike in the ways that they cause outbreaks and impact communities. We should emphasize the question of what we need to
do, rather than what we need to have.
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Signiﬁcance to AJMTH readers: The Society membership always has
been interested in epidemic threats emerging from those areas with
pervasive tropical disease burdens. Since the 2014 West Africa Ebola
virus disease epidemic, the membership has become increasingly
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interested in how things work, and how best to intercede on public
health needs. This piece brings together these interests with technically
focused, patient- and community-centered outcome advocacy.
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